HOUSTON — They have preached passing the baton, practicing patience or putting an opposing pitcher in hell. And, for fleeting moments of a frustrating season, the Houston Astros accomplished all of it. Their lineup led the American League with a .262 batting average and finished with the sport’s eighth-highest OPS.
Each of the seven lineups with a higher one averaged more runs per game. All had a higher slugging percentage, worked more walks and saw at least 3.84 pitches per plate appearance, too. Houston saw a major-league low 3.65. No number better accentuates a season-long departure from the franchise’s offensive foundation.
Only the Miami Marlins’ lineup chased outside the strike zone more than Houston’s. Only the Marlins and Colorado Rockies swung more. No offense saw fewer pitches and only three worked fewer walks.
Personnel changes could’ve portended some problems before the season, but what unfolded might have been more drastic than anyone anticipated. Scoring three runs and totaling one extra-base hit during a Wild Card Series loss against the Detroit Tigers offered a fitting end to an uneven season.
“At times, we kind of got away from who we are, our offensive identity,” manager Joe Espada acknowledged after the season. “We’ll continue to preach and coach and teach who we are as an organization, what has made us successful in the years past. We’ll look at all those things moving forward.”
| Team | Swing% | BB% | Pitches Per PA | Chase Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2021
|
45.40%
|
9.00%
|
3.9
|
25.70%
|
|
2022
|
48%
|
8.70%
|
3.78
|
29.20%
|
|
2023
|
48.10%
|
8.80%
|
3.82
|
30%
|
|
2024
|
50%
|
7.30%
|
3.65
|
31.80%
|
Though neither Espada nor general manager Dana Brown acknowledged it last week, bolstering Houston’s lineup must be the club’s foremost objective this winter. What Brown and his baseball operations team must weigh is whether improvement will come from returning players, or whether searching for a specific offensive profile on the open market is more conducive to immediate success.
Former general manager Jeff Luhnow had a similar mission in 2017 and 2018, winters in which he added Josh Reddick, Michael Brantley and Brian McCann to curtail the club’s sky-high strikeout rate. An already bloated payroll might not permit Brown to be as active.
“We’re going to have to make some wise decisions as to, are there younger players that we can call up and put in certain roles to maybe save some money here,” Brown said, “and then we could allocate that money to be used in other places.”
Though Espada endorsed his lineup as “still one of the best in the big leagues,” Brown acknowledged the quality of at-bats diminished during points of the season. Espada attempted to assign some of the blame to a bevy of young players Houston had to use in response to José Abreu’s release and Kyle Tucker’s fractured shin.
Tucker’s absence deprived the Astros of a hitter with a career 23.8 percent chase rate, 10.8 percent walk rate and, last season, a 47 percent swing rate. It magnified Chas McCormick’s season-long slump, forced Jake Meyers to play every day and exposed the shortcomings of Houston’s nonexistent depth at the upper minor leagues.
Espada said those are players who thought “that aggressiveness is the best path to move forward when it comes to hitting at the major-league level.” It prompts wonder, then, why Houston would entrust similar players short on experience with prominent roles.
Evolution is possible — and should be expected — but presuming it will happen instantly is illogical. Established, returning players will be more meaningful to authoring a turnaround. If third baseman Alex Bregman departs in free agency, the task is even more complicated.
In June, Bregman bemoaned the Astros’ aggressive approach but couldn’t escape blame. His swing rate spiked to a career-high 44.9 percent, his on-base percentage plummeted 51 points below his career average, and he sported an almost shocking 6.9 percent walk rate. In 2023, it was 12.7 percent.
Bregman is one of eight Houston hitters who took at least 400 plate appearances this season. Four of them, including Bregman, had an on-base percentage of .315 or lower. Neither Meyers nor Mauricio Dubón eclipsed .300. Jeremy Peña did, but his .308 mark sat 16 points lower than what he posted last season.
Peña is Houston’s fastest player. Meyers and McCormick rank second and third. That none of them could get on base above a .310 clip accentuated another problem — an inability to force action for a lineup that struggled to score runs.
No offense took extra bases at a lower rate than the Astros’, and just nine stole fewer bases. That, in turn, forced an aging roster to play a station-to-station style it was ill-equipped to maintain. Slugging more would have solved the problem, but dramatic dips from Jose Altuve and Yainer Diaz only magnified it. Both men slugged over .520 in 2023. Last season, neither eclipsed .441.
Perhaps the team believes Altuve or Diaz will harness more consistent power and offer a solution, but targeting a player touted for his athleticism and ability to get on base would inject some energy this club does not have.
That Meyers and McCormick were both unable to provide it must prompt questions about whether keeping both on the roster is prudent. Even if the answer is no, trading one won’t be a panacea. More prolific players must perform as such.
Altuve chased outside the strike zone a career-high 37.3 percent of the time this season. Only 14 players had a higher chase rate. Two of them were Dubón and Diaz.
That Altuve only made contact on 62.7 percent of those swings outside the strike zone must be more alarming. Altuve is a contact connoisseur, a man often lauded for his ability to hit anything anywhere it is pitched. His career chase contact percentage is 70.9 percent — more than 8 percentage points above what he boasted this season.
Altuve still authored an admirable season. He made his ninth All-Star team, slashed .295/.350/.439 and finished with an OPS+ 26 points above league average. He also turned 35 in May and assumed a much higher workload than Espada or anyone would’ve envisioned before the season. Only 28 players logged more defensive innings than Altuve. Among them, only Paul Goldschmidt — a first baseman — is older than Altuve.
Supplying more depth to absorb some of Altuve’s defensive workload might be prudent. Dubón is already there, but he has the exact offensive profile that put Houston in this position. Only four players swung more than him this season and only six had a higher chase rate.
Tucker’s playing a full season alongside Alvarez might render that moot. So would Altuve or Diaz’s rediscovering their slug and Peña’s finding more ways to reach base. Whether the Astros believe any of this is possible will dictate their next moves.
(Top photo: Tim Warner / Getty Images)
