“We cannot transport one reality to another,” said incoming Manchester United manager Ruben Amorim, after his Sporting Lisbon side defeated Manchester City 4-1 in the Champions League.
“United cannot play the way (Sporting) play — they cannot be so defensive… I’ll be living in a different world. We’ll have to start from a different point.”
Amorim was referring specifically to the fact his Sporting side had played defensively against City, surrendering possession and playing primarily on the break. But it was a reminder that managers don’t view their system at previous clubs as a ready-made template for their new charges. That applies to formation, as well as style.
Amorim is seemingly wedded to a three-man defence, and it’s difficult to remember any coach arriving in the Premier League with such a commitment to that style. Even Antonio Conte, whose use of 3-4-3 prompted a mini-revolution in the Premier League, was initially considered a 4-2-4 man in his formative coaching days in Italy.
Conte switched to a three-man defence at Juventus because he had Giorgio Chiellini, Leonardo Bonucci and Andrea Barzagli at his disposal, and when taking charge of Italy, used the same players in the same roles. Upon arriving at Chelsea he started with 4-3-3, and famously only switched to 3-4-3 after finding himself 3-0 down away at Arsenal. His signing of Marcos Alonso, who lacked defensive qualities but thrived in a wing-back role at Fiorentina, at least hinted he was planning on playing that way at some point. But it wasn’t his Plan A.
Amorim’s love of a three-man defence goes back to the fourth game of his managerial career. Taking charge of third-tier Casa Pia in 2018-19, he lost his first two matches in charge and said he would quit if he lost the third.
“We won the third game in a 4-4-2,” remembers the club’s sporting director at that time, Carlos Pires. “After this game, he told me he would change the system. I asked him why, because we had won, so it made no sense to change it. But with the 3-4-3, Ruben told me to trust in the process because, with a line of five players at the back, we will be more consistent and balanced. And he never changed, with Braga B, Braga and with Sporting. From that game, he always used that system.”
Most managers have a favoured formation, but they’re less wedded to it than is often assumed. Jurgen Klopp was generally a 4-2-3-1 man at Borussia Dortmund but was noted for his 4-3-3 at Liverpool; Pep Guardiola was heavily associated with 4-3-3 at Barcelona but has been much more flexible at Bayern Munich and Manchester City. Managers generally adjust to the top-class attacking tools at their disposal.
United’s appointment of Amorim is interesting, because things are a little different when it comes to the defensive base of a side. A manager can tilt between, say, 4-3-3, 4-2-3-1 and 4-4-2 relatively easily, but when it comes to a three-man defence, it’s a radically different manner of defending, and pressing, and playing out from the back. Not once in four and a half years in charge of Sporting has Amorim used a four-man defence, although often one of his centre-backs stepped forward into a holding midfield role during build-up play. Such was his commitment to a back three, both Manchester City and Liverpool supposedly questioned whether he would be suited to managing their current squad.
That was interesting, because City have spent long periods playing with a back three in possession, with either a full-back like Rico Lewis or a centre-back like John Stones stepping into midfield. A permanent back three wouldn’t have been a complete departure. Liverpool, meanwhile, have a full-back pairing of Trent Alexander-Arnold and Andrew Robertson who are known for overlapping and crossing, and while there’s no guarantee a good full-back will be a good wing-back — the roles are more different than sometimes considered — it hardly seemed a disastrous fit.
Manchester United, on the other hand, don’t look at all suited to playing in that manner. Diogo Dalot and Noussair Mazraoui have generally played in the full-back positions this season, swapping between left-back and right-back, and have often drifted inside into the centre rather than hugging the touchline; Mazraoui was even fielded as a No 10 by Erik ten Hag in one match. As two right-footers, neither is suited to stretching the play down the left.
Luke Shaw has successfully played left wing-back for England before — he opened the scoring in the Euro 2020 final from that role — but when United used that system under Ole Gunnar Solskjaer, Shaw often tucked inside to play on the outside of the back three. Unlike Conte at Chelsea, Amorim doesn’t have the luxury of signing a ready-made left wing-back to make the system work — at least not yet. It’s difficult to imagine any of United’s current wingers being successfully deployed in that role, either.
Switching from the Primeira Liga to the Premier League is rightly considered a major step up. But what isn’t always fully understood about a league like the Portuguese top flight isn’t the overall level, it’s more about the inequality within the league. Using Opta’s global power ranking tool, which ranks thousands of clubs around the world on an ELO system based on results, we can discover quite how different it is to manage in Portugal compared to England. Amorim’s Sporting side are currently considered the 10th-best side in Europe (and this week beat the top-ranked side). Their usual rivals, Porto and Benfica, are 18th and 27th — roughly as good as the Premier League sides challenging for Champions League qualification.
But after that, the drop-off is stark. Only two other sides, Braga and Vitoria, are considered Premier League quality. Otherwise, most sides are roughly of Championship standard, with the relegation battlers being more like League One standard.
And therefore, if you’re managing one of the big three in Portugal, your week-in, week-out task is based on breaking down the opposition. Controlling possession is almost guaranteed.
With that large difference in quality in mind, it’s worth considering Amorim’s results against the other two big sides in Portugal. In his 19 games against Porto and Benfica, Amorim’s Sporting won five, drew seven and lost seven.
Taking Amorim’s four complete seasons in charge, from 2020-21 to 2023-24 (and therefore, for the record, ignoring defeats to Porto and Benfica in Amorim’s first half-season, and a win over Porto this season), a head-to-head table of the big three comes out with Porto on 25 points, and Benfica and Sporting on 19 points. That’s not to use this as a criticism of Amorim, who took over Sporting when they were struggling so much that the concept of the ‘Big Three’ had almost become the ‘Big Two’. But his success in Portugal was not because he achieved consistently good results against strong opposition; it was more about consistently defeating Championship-level sides.
That could be framed either way. You can make an argument that it’s good that Amorim’s side thrived when on the front foot. Or you could say his tactics worked better against sides who, in general, weren’t of the strength Amorim will encounter in the Premier League. But he might find that his default formation at Sporting, where one of the central midfielders pushed forward to become an additional No 10, for example, leaves the defence exposed to quick breaks.
Andre Villas-Boas, whose Porto side won the Europa League as well as going the Portuguese league season unbeaten in 2010-11, had to compromise when taking charge of Chelsea in the summer of 2011, despite initially framing himself as a stubborn ideologue.
Despite having previously worked in the Premier League, in an opposition scouting role at Chelsea, Villas-Boas was shocked by the intensity of opposition counter-attacks in England. Whereas his two deepest midfielders at Porto used to rotate positions, he learned this didn’t work in England and instead used a ‘fixed’ holding midfielder. He also learned his high defensive line was breached too easily, so his side retreated significantly. Eventually, his side lost their identity.
Amorim will want to avoid that. But his identity seems to be about a three-man defence more than anything else, and using that from the outset at United will be difficult. Research by 21st Group shows that of Manchester United’s current squad, only three players have played a higher-than-average percentage of their career matches in a system featuring a three-man defence.
One of them is Rasmus Hojlund — a centre-forward, so not particularly relevant. Another was Mason Mount, who thrived in Thomas Tuchel’s 3-4-2-1 at Chelsea, but who has struggled for form and fitness for two years. The third is Manuel Ugarte, who played under Amorim at Sporting. Other than that, it’s difficult to see that many other players are naturally more suited to a three-man defence.
That suggests Amorim’s opening weeks at United will involve a large amount of compromise — either in terms of his preferred formation or in terms of fielding square pegs in round holes. Either way, it’s clear that this won’t be a simple mid-season switch. Given the potential difficulties of introducing this new system, United’s failure to take decisive action in the summer and instead waiting until autumn appears like a particular error.
Additional reporting: Charlotte Harpur
(Top photo: Patricia De Melo Moreira/Getty Images)
