Innovation comes naturally to Purdue football, from its legacy as “The Cradle of Quarterbacks,” to its “Spoilermakers” nickname.
Offensive success forms the base of Purdue’s identity. The Boilermakers’ reliance on the passing game was long distinctive from their Big Ten counterparts, who largely were line of scrimmage teams. Joe Tiller developed the first spread offense in Big Ten history and it guided Purdue to the Rose Bowl in 2000. An electrifying route tree with players to match later propelled Jeff Brohm to a Big Ten West Division title in 2022. In a conference of punchers, the Boilers won games as a boxer.
Yet when those coaches left, Purdue administrators chose different team-building philosophies, and the program suffered because of it. The Boilermakers are in the same position yet again after firing defensive-minded coach Ryan Walters on Sunday. Walters, who finished with a 5-19 record in two seasons, was the mastermind at Illinois who molded the nation’s top scoring defense.
Purdue athletic director Mike Bobinski believed he was getting the best coach available in Walters, then age 36. After announcing his hiring, Bobinski praised Walters for his defensive coaching prowess at Illinois, saying, “I know that’s a word (defense) that makes people nervous here, for God’s sake like we don’t want to play defense.”
When they were winning games, the Boilers played good defense. Tiller’s defensive coordinator, current Illinois State coach Brock Spack, churned out several high-level NFL defenders. Brohm had a first-round defensive end in George Karlaftis. But they won with offense, and that’s what they need now.
“Would we go back to an offensive-minded coach?” Bobinski told reporters Monday. “We’re going to go back to a winning coach is what we’re going to go back to. I think you can do that in a lot of different ways.”
Based on history, Purdue should lean into its identity rather than sanitize the process. Without the resources or recruiting profile of many Big Ten competitors, the Boilermakers’ previous success was based on what they did differently. From 2017-22, Purdue ranked behind only Ohio State among Big Ten teams in passing yards (21,364) and passing touchdowns (160). That led to top-five upsets over the Buckeyes, Iowa and Michigan State. Brohm took a walk-on quarterback in Aidan O’Connell and molded him into an NFL starting quarterback while turning three wide receivers into draft picks.
However, these identity missteps are not unique to Purdue. The same situation took place in reverse at Wisconsin. After three decades of high-level success as a power offense built by gap blocking, mauling 340-pound linemen and All-American running backs, coach Luke Fickell scrapped the scheme for an Air Raid attack when he took over in 2023.
When the Badgers last won the Big Ten West Division title in 2019, they averaged 34.1 points, 233 yards on the ground and 200 in the air with 35 minutes, 37 seconds a game in time of possession. This year, scoring was down (22.6 points per game), rushing yards fell to 153.7 a contest and the passing game averaged 196.7 yards. Time of possession was at a deficit (29:21) and the defensive numbers were even worse. The Air Raid fizzled, and everything suffered.
There are other historical examples of teams losing their identity. It took years for Michigan to get right after changing philosophies when Lloyd Carr retired after the 2007 season. The Wolverines hired Rich Rodriguez as Carr’s replacement, but his spread style did not fit with the personnel or scheme in Ann Arbor. From 2008-10, the Wolverines were 6-18 in Big Ten play, and Rodriguez was fired. Brady Hoke tried to return Michigan to its roots, but he wasn’t much better at 18-14 in the league and also was let go. Jim Harbaugh built Michigan back into being a Big Ten contender with physicality as its primary tenet. It still took time for the Wolverines to dethrone Ohio State as Big Ten champions, which they eventually accomplished in 2021. In 2023, Michigan won the national title.
Michigan always had the infrastructure and tradition to compete for national titles, but it needed to lean into its identity to make it work. The only Big Ten program to alter a proven identity and take a step forward was Ohio State. A ground-acquisition team under Jim Tressel, the Buckeyes shifted to a speed-based offense under Urban Meyer in 2012 and there was no letdown. But Ohio State could accomplish it because it could out-recruit any identity. Other programs — even Michigan — don’t have that luxury.
Wisconsin and Iowa have battled one another for decades in the upper Midwest for offensive line candidates. Their tradition of developing NFL linemen gave them a near-even shot with blue bloods like Ohio State, Michigan and Notre Dame in the Chicago suburbs for high-level line prospects. That doesn’t happen at wide receiver. It’s easier for the Badgers and Hawkeyes to find oversized farm boys than pass catchers who run a 4.3-second 40-yard dash within their footprint. When high-level receivers are within their borders, they usually leave for a program with success at developing them.
Purdue had the opposite issue. It out-recruited its former Big Ten West colleagues for explosive playmakers because it had a track record for big passing numbers. But when it battled Wisconsin or Iowa for offensive linemen, Purdue regularly lost those prospects.
Walters attempted to keep a pass-first philosophy when he hired Air Raid pupil Graham Harrell as his offensive coordinator two years ago. But he quickly discovered it ran counter to what he wanted to do defensively. Brohm understood that his defense couldn’t be bend-but-don’t-break because it didn’t allow his offense enough possessions. He sought an aggressive, attacking style of defense that often gave up big plays but made them, too. There was no complementary component in place for Walters with that style of offense.
Three years ago, a season before Purdue won the West Division title, the Boilers averaged 29.1 points per game and gave up 22.4. Even though the running game was paltry (84 yards per game), they still held the ball for 31:57 a contest because they had a high competition percentage. This year, Purdue scored 15.8 points and gave up 39.9 points a game and managed just 26:51 in time of possession. Nothing went right in any facet.
At Wisconsin, the offensive woes contributed to Fickell firing Air Raid offensive coordinator Phil Longo with two games remaining. For a program that felt the previous philosophy was outdated, Fickell brought in Longo to modernize the scheme. Instead, it set Wisconsin back. When it regularly won divisional titles, the only position keeping Wisconsin behind the Big Ten elite was quarterback, not scheme.
Other programs face similar identity crises such as Oklahoma on offense and USC on defense, and it nearly cost both bowl eligibility this year. The lesson from the Wisconsin and Purdue situations is for programs to remain cognizant of what has led to their historical success. By changing an identity, a program seeks a different path. Sometimes the best road home is the one most frequently traveled.
(Top photo of Purdue playing at Indiana on Nov. 30: Trevor Ruszkowski / Imagn Images)
