Modern football coverage has never been so focused on individuals, at a time when the game itself has never been so systemic.
The reaction to Manchester City’s 4-0 home defeat against Tottenham Hotspur on Saturday was a good example — this was, from City’s perspective, surely a collective collapse rather than one based on individual failings. But post-match coverage focused largely on Kyle Walker, and the space Tottenham found in behind him.
So here, by way of providing some balance, is a defence of Walker, who was put in a very difficult position because of City manager Pep Guardiola’s approach.
First, here’s a look at three times City conceded possession in the first half. Here’s Savinho on a counter-attack, playing the ball sideways, vaguely towards Rico Lewis…
… but the ball runs out for a throw-in.
Here’s Savinho again, trying to feed Erling Haaland…
… but the pass is behind him and Spurs full-back Destiny Udogie can collect the ball under no pressure.
And here’s the normally reliable Bernardo Silva, wanting to play a sideways pass to a team-mate…
… but directing it to neither Walker nor Lewis, and instead straight to Tottenham’s Son Heung-min.
They were three sloppy mistakes, certainly. But the common theme is that City were essentially playing without a right-winger, and had nobody on the near side as we’re looking at the pitch in the above images either to collect stray balls or provide the target for an intentional pass.
And that was because of Guardiola’s tactics.
On paper, it seemed Savinho would play on the right. But he was instead fielded from the left, and asked to drift inside. Bernardo played deeper, as part of a three-man midfield when City were in possession. So their width — which once came from the likes of proper wide forwards such as Leroy Sane and Raheem Sterling — was now being provided by Josko Gvardiol, a converted centre-back, and the 34-year-old Walker.
At times, Lewis and Phil Foden offered some width on the City right, but on other occasions it was Walker completely alone on that flank.
In fact, he nearly got in behind for a good chance early on, when the bounce on Ilkay Gundogan’s well-flighted ball just evaded him.
This was once Walker’s default approach to the game, but in recent years he has tucked inside, playing as part of a back three or moving inside into midfield. Asking him to be a constant overlapper on Saturday was largely out of keeping with his performances in other matches this season, as the below chart demonstrates.
The reason Guardiola has moved away from using overlapping full-backs like this is, of course, because it opens up space for the opposition when possession is lost. And, realistically, if you want Walker to be pushing forward onto the last line of the opposition defence, you can’t expect him to be completely solid defensively, too.
The game’s first goal was a decent example.
You can argue that Walker should be deeper to start with, expecting the worst. But it does look like Gvardiol is in control of this situation against Dejan Kulusevski, and it was surprising that he lost the ball. Walker is, quite reasonably, anticipating that his immediate task will be providing the right-sided attacking width. He then has to sprint backwards into position.
And, really, he does this as well as can be expected. He makes sure he’s goalside of Son. But Gundogan and John Stones don’t work out who is tracking James Maddison…
…and he ghosts in to volley home Kulusevski’s lovely cross.
If Walker were playing as a third defender, tucking inside rather than pushing on, he probably would be in a position to intercept this ball. The fact he isn’t there is more about the system than his own positioning.
The second goal is a similar situation.
Walker’s job, as City play out, is to stretch the play. When Gvardiol concedes possession here, Walker’s not even in the frame — again, this is more about the system City are using than anything else.
Again, he has to sprint back suddenly into a defensive position…
…a task made harder by the fact Maddison and Son work the situation brilliantly.
But Walker is only a yard away from getting back into position and stopping Maddison. Granted, maybe that’s the yard of pace he’s lost to age. But it’s a very difficult ask to play as one of City’s primary attackers and also as their right-back, especially when the turnover of possession was in such a poor position.
As for the final goal in stoppage time…
Well, yes, Timo Werner breezes past Walker easily…
…to square the ball for a Brennan Johnson tap-in…
…but Werner only came on in the 89th minute, while Walker had played the whole game. It’s hardly surprising that Werner’s first sprint of the game is quicker than Walker’s 50th.
There’s no doubt Walker has always been overly reliant on his recovery pace, and at 34 it’s probable some of that quality has faded.
Former players often talk about players needing to adjust when they’ve lost speed, and play more intelligently. But Walker, in fairness, has largely done that already, changing his game to become a more defensive-minded operator. And the adjustment must also come from the player’s manager.
Here, Guardiola asked too much from Walker, and was arguably a victim of his own caution — had he fielded a proper right-winger against Spurs, City would also have had a more reliable right-back.
