NFL Week 3 best and worst coaching decisions: Kevin O'Connell, Vic Fangio stand out

The real contenders started showing themselves in Week 3 and the pretenders started telling on themselves. Philadelphia Eagles defensive coordinator Vic Fangio dusted off an old game plan with a modern twist to stop the New Orleans Saints from marching into the end zone all but once. The Minnesota Vikings are missing key offensive assets but are still one of the league’s most explosive offenses thanks to coach Kevin O’Connell’s scheme. The Philadelphia Eagles and the Atlanta Falcons made some unfortunate fourth-down calls, and the Las Vegas Raiders continue to end up on the wrong side of this column.

Vic Fangio halts another red-hot offense

Fangio, the originator of the game plan that put a screeching halt to Sean McVay’s powerhouse Los Angeles Rams offenses, shut down another red-hot outside zone offense in New Orleans. He did it with an updated version of that original game plan. In 2018, when Fangio was the Chicago Bears’ defensive coordinator, he used a 6-1 (six defensive players on the line of scrimmage with one linebacker behind them) to defend the Rams. The New England Patriots took his game plan and ran it almost exclusively on early downs while famously holding the Rams to 3 points in Super Bowl LII.

The 6-1 works well against outside zone offenses because there’s an extra player on both edges and the offensive line is forced to single block rather than double-team. Offenses have some answers like running inside or checking into power runs. The Saints were prepared for this look. Early in the game, you could hear quarterback Derek Carr yell out “6-1! 6-1!” at the line of scrimmage. But Fangio disguised the front by shifting into it late and using nontraditional players in the front, making it hard for the offense to adjust.

12:00 remaining in the second quarter, second-and-10

Coming into the game, the Saints had the third-highest rate of second-and-long (7+ yards) in the league so the Eagles were prepared to deal with the run in such situations instead of defending the pass, which is more usual in today’s league.

In the diagram, the Eagles showed a regular 4-2 front with four defensive linemen on the line of scrimmage.

Right before the snap, they shifted into their modified 6-1. Inside linebacker Zack Baun crept up to the right edge and nickel Avonte Maddox, just outside of the frame, was responsible for the left edge. Nakobe Dean was the lone off-ball linebacker.

After the snap, the Saints were only able to get one double-team and it was against the Eagles’ best run stuffer, Jordan Davis. This freed up Dean to get to the edge unblocked. Maddox got cracked, but the front did a good job of stringing the run out to corner Quinyon Mitchell, who made a good tackle. Defensive tackle Jalen Carter benefitted most from all the one-on-ones created. He dominated against the run and the pass. That might have been the best game of his career.

The Saints created explosive pass plays in the first two games with deep-shot play-actions with max protection and two-man pass concepts. With the 6-1, Fangio played soft zone coverage that easily handled the Saints’ bread-and-butter route concepts.

13:17 remaining in the fourth quarter, first-and-10

Here, the Eagles again shifted into their six-man front late and showed a Cover 4 shell pre-snap.

After the snap, the four-deep shell collected the two downfield receivers while the two underneath defenders took away Carr’s checkdowns.

Fangio’s defense is ideal at taking away some of the staple concepts from the Shanahan/Kubiak offense. In the first two weeks, the Saints were fourth in the league with a 14.4 percent explosive play rate. Against the Eagles, that rate dropped down to 5.5 percent, which would rank near the bottom of the league. Fangio again proved he is one of the league’s best defensive game planners.

Kevin O’Connell is cookin’

Vikings defensive coordinator Brian Flores is making headlines, and rightfully so. That defense is doing some special things in a unique way, which I highlighted in last week’s column, but let’s give some recognition to coach Kevin O’Connell. He has the Vikings offense playing efficient football with journeyman quarterback Sam Darnold. The Vikings rank sixth in explosive play rate (16.1 percent) and 10th in EPA (expected points added) per play. They are doing all this without their starting tight end (T.J. Hockenson) and No. 2 receiver (Jordan Addison).

Having Justin Jefferson certainly helps, but how often do we see defenses take away a top receiver? O’Connell doesn’t allow that to happen, and his scheme is a big reason Jefferson continues to produce despite defenses’ focusing on him.

4:31 remaining in the first quarter, first-and-10

The Vikings came out with two tight ends and Jefferson to the left of the formation before shifting tight end Josh Oliver to the right. After the shift, the defense rotated their safeties to Oliver’s side.

After the snap, Oliver ran a flat route to occupy the safety, the hook defender was occupied by a short crosser, and the corner and free safety had to respect the deep route to the right.

That left a huge void in the secondary for Jefferson, who also ran a crosser.

No one was close to Jefferson when he caught the pass. The best receiver in football should never be this open. Jefferson does plenty to get open on his own, but he can thank O’Connell for this catch.

Now the dislikes in Week 3:

Falcons’ fourth-and-1 play call

The Falcons had a chance to get a late lead on the Kansas City Chiefs, driving into the red zone down by 5 points with less than a minute remaining. On fourth-and-1, the Falcons came out in a heavy set with two tight ends, two backs, one receiver, lined up in a split back formation. They tried to run an outside zone play, which got stuffed by an unblocked defender. The play call received criticism because the Falcons tried to run outside when they only needed a yard. Running back Bijan Robinson explained the call.

“We had a call to go downhill,” Robinson said after the game. “It looked like it was going to be different, so we changed the play. When we changed the play, we had to account for a couple of guys. No. 32 (Nick Bolton) came free right up the middle, so it was tough. When I get the ball, I have to try to make a decision right now. He came out and tried to switch and go and that was my line, so it was hard for me. Obviously, I’m going to try and do better to break that tackle and make that play regardless of the situation.”

0:56 remaining in the fourth quarter, fourth-and-1

If the original play call was a downhill run, I’d expect it to look like this: either an iso play with a lead blocker going vertically, or a straight dive into the pile. The angles weren’t favorable, but it seemed like they would have every inside defender accounted for. However, with every defender angled inside, I could see why Kirk Cousins changed the play.

Cousins audibly yelled, “Can! Can! Can!” at the line of scrimmage, meaning there were two play calls. The first was the downhill run Robinson talked about, and the second was the perimeter play the Falcons ran.

The second play call appeared to be one of the Falcons’ bread-and-butter run concepts, an outside zone variant called “Zorro.”

In this diagram from Kyle Shanahan’s time as the Falcons offensive coordinator, the fullback is responsible for taking the inside shade of the edge defender and the tight end (Y) has the outside shade. Robinson comes from the same system, and “Zorro” is a play every outside zone team has in the playbook. The Falcons just ran it out of a different formation in the playbook.

This explains why running back Tyler Allgeier, playing fullback on the play, ran straight outside to block the edge rather than looking inside. Because of all the defenders inside, Bolton was unaccounted for by the offensive line and tackled Robinson in the backfield.

Chiefs get the stop on fourth down!!!!

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— NFL (@NFL) September 23, 2024

It was smart to have a second play call, but with the heavy fronts they were expecting to see, you would think they’d have a play call that is more sound. It’s also hard to run this play out of splitbacks because it takes longer for Robinson to reach the edge. Teams often will toss the ball to the running back so they can get to the perimeter quicker. Offensive coordinator Zac Robinson has been good while dealing with the disadvantages of an immobile Cousins, but this is a learning experience for the relatively inexperienced offensive coordinator.

Nick Sirianni’s fourth-down decisions

Coaches usually end up on this list for being too conservative on fourth down, but Eagles coach Nick Sirianni has been erratic, going for it when he shouldn’t and not going for it when he should. According to ESPN’s Benjamin Solak, the Next Gen model strongly favored kicking a field goal on fourth-and-1 with 15 seconds left in the first half. This was likely because little time was left on the clock and they would have to use one of their last two timeouts after a run. It would have been difficult to score a touchdown.

However, the Eagles went for it, and instead of calling their patented quarterback sneak, they tried to fake like they were going to but ran a sweep to running back Saquon Barkley. Sirianni said he made the play call, not offensive coordinator Kellen Moore. I didn’t think the play call was bad. They needed a big play if they were going to go for it, and a sweep had a chance if they had better blocking on the perimeter. I’m more opposed to the idea of coming in and overruling the primary play caller. Moore was hired to bolster a stale offense, and Sirianni is a CEO-type coach.

Let your coaches do their jobs. Don’t throw them off of their rhythm. You’re paying them to make the right call in high-leverage situations!

Raiders trying to establish run

Many factors contributed to the Raiders’ surprising 36-22 trouncing by the winless Carolina Panthers. Before this week, the Panthers haven’t had a lead since January 2023, according to The Athletic’s Joe Person. Coming into the game, the Panthers defense was the third-worst defense in success rate (46.5 percent) in points per drive (3.17) and had the fifth-worst defensive rushing success rate (53.8 percent) in the league.

The Raiders ranked dead last the first two weeks in rushing success rate (17.1 percent), and it’s not close. The easily movable object met the object that won’t move and nothing moved. Against the Panthers, the Raiders had a rushing success rate of 26 percent, which was better than average but still would rank near the bottom of the league. The biggest problem was how the Raiders continued to try to establish the run even though they weren’t moving the ball.

Preparing for the game, coach Antonio Pierce talked about the need to establish the run, and I don’t fault them for trying to do so against a bad run defense, but after it was clear they weren’t going to be able to, they kept trying to bang their heads against the wall. Last week against the Baltimore Ravens, the offense found a rhythm by getting into 11 personnel (one back, one tight end, three receivers) and going to a pass-heavy script because they were down. They got the ball to receiver Davante Adams and tight end Brock Bowers and completed a double-digit fourth-quarter comeback.

They decided not to take the same approach against the Panthers. Offensive coordinator Luke Getsy went with a first down-second down run sequence four times in the game. On one series, they ran the ball three times in a row for 7 yards and failed to convert on a fourth-and-3 pass. After a first half of inefficient running, down 14 points, they started the second half with two straight rushes for 4 yards and failed to convert on third-and-6.

They treated this game like preseason and weren’t aggressive. For the Raiders, running the ball is a waste of a play and it constantly puts them in second- and third-and-long situations. Their best assets are their pass catchers, and they have to do a better job of getting them the ball early and often.