NFL Week 9 best and worst coaching decisions: Cardinals OC Drew Petzing outwits Bears

5 November 2024Last Update :
NFL Week 9 best and worst coaching decisions: Cardinals OC Drew Petzing outwits Bears

Football is a results-oriented business, but sometimes making a sound decision doesn’t always equate to desirable results. We saw this play out in both the Eagles’ — yes, the Eagles — and Seahawks’ games.

The Cardinals have one of the league’s most unique offenses and they embarrassed a very good Bears defense Sunday.

We’ll break down the Eagles’ and Seahawks’ calls and the Cardinals’ game plan versus the Bears’ lack of one in this week’s best and worst coaching decisions.

Drew Petzing outclasses Matt Eberflus

The matchup between the Bears defense and Cardinals offense was a heavyweight fight. Coming into the game, against base defenses (four defensive backs), the Cardinals led the league in explosive play rate (14.9 percent) and were third in offensive success rate (52.4 percent). The Bears defense led the league in defensive success rate with their base defense.

The Cardinals, who forced the Bears into their base defense frequently with multiple tight end sets, rushed for 114 yards on 23 carries against base. One reason the Bears defense has been effective from base is they have a very good third off-ball linebacker, Jack Sanborn, which is a rarity in today’s NFL. The Cardinals’ game plan was to take Sanborn out of the mix with formations, and the Bears didn’t adjust.

3:23 remaining in the first quarter, first-and-10

Here, the Cardinals lined up in a slot formation (two receivers to one side) to the right with two tight ends to the left. The Bears were in a two-deep safety look, so Sanborn had to widen out to the slot, taking him out of position to defend the run.

The Cardinals had a trap play called toward the two tight ends side away from Sanborn. On a trap play, the play-side end is left unblocked for a puller to block him.

The play was well-blocked, Sanborn was too far away to make an impact and the play-side safety was too deep to make a play before running back James Conner gained 15 yards.

Later in the game, the Cardinals lined up in an unbalanced formation with right tackle Kelvin Beachum lined up at tight end to the left and two actual tight ends lined up to the right.

8:13 remaining in the second quarter, second-and-2

The Cardinals also had a wide receiver lined up outside to the right, so the Bears had to commit extra defenders to that side. Sanborn lined up to the right. Because the Bears were in a two-deep look, they didn’t have enough defenders to account for the extra gap created by Beachum. The Cardinals called a counter run to Beachum’s side.

Again, Sanborn wasn’t in position to make a play on the run and the play-side safety was too deep to defend the run on time.

Last week, on the play before surrendering a Hail Mary now infamous in Chicago, coach Matt Eberflus had the Bears secondary play too soft. It gave the Commanders an easy 13-yard gain and allowed them to get out of bounds, which allowed them to set up for the Hail Mary. Perhaps that play was on his mind before halftime against the Cardinals. On third-and-5 with only 12 seconds remaining in the first half, the Cardinals seemed content with just running out the clock. The defense lined up in two deep, but Eberflus called a blitz, thinking the Cardinals would pass.

0:12 remaining in the second quarter, third-and-5

The Cardinals had a pin-and-pull sweep called with the center and right guard pulling outside. The Bears had a nickel blitz called toward the run side.

The pullers blocked both the edge defender and blitzer perfectly, opening up a huge lane for Emari Demercado to run through. The defense was in two deep and the play-side safety was easily blocked, allowing Demercado to scamper for a 53-yard touchdown.

The call here isn’t egregious. I understand Eberflus’ mindset, trying not to give the Cardinals the first down and possibly setting up for a Hail Mary but, ironically, he ended up setting up the Bears perfectly to get gashed for the run. The football gods have a cruel sense of humor. Overall, the Cardinals were too physical, and offensive coordinator Drew Petzing outclassed Eberflus on the chessboard. It’s been a rough couple of weeks for Eberflus.

Eagles decisions

Was Eagles head coach Nick Sirianni too aggressive against a bad opponent and made the game closer than it needed to be? Yes. Do I think his decisions were as egregious as some are making them out to be? No.

The Eagles are an analytics-based team, and that approach has won them a lot of games and typically gives them an edge. You don’t hear much about it when they succeed, but there’s always the chance that it backfires as it did against the Jaguars. The Eagles left six points on the field and put their defense in a bad position late in the game. Let’s look at each decision.

Two-point attempt with 22 seconds left in the second quarter

Saquon Barkley’s 19-yard touchdown put the Eagles ahead 16-0. The Jaguars jumped offsides, allowing the Eagles to go for two from the 1-yard line. With how automatic their “tush push” is, they typically go for two in these situations. They called for the sneak, it looked like quarterback Jalen Hurts got the ball across the line, but he was ruled short.

Two-point attempt with 9:30 remaining in the third quarter

After a Hurts 18-yard touchdown run, the Eagles went up 22-0. Jags safety Andre Cisco committed a personal foul, again giving the Eagles the ball on the 1-yard line. Again, they typically go for two when presented with this opportunity. They failed. The Eagles weren’t chasing points, this is just their philosophy, and with the success rate of the “tush push” being well above 90 percent, I get it.

Going for it on fourth-and-1 pass with 1:25 remaining in the third quarter

The Jaguars had cut the lead to six points. The Eagles were well in field goal range with the ball on the Jaguars’ 25-yard line. They had a fourth-and-short, so “tush push” time, right? Nope. Instead, they tried to pass the ball, the Jaguars had every route perfectly covered, and Hurts was forced to throw the ball away with nowhere to run. I don’t hate the decision, but I hate the play call. The “tush push” was stopped twice already, but they should have played the percentages and tried again. Going up nine with a field goal would have made it a two-possession game, but there was still a lot of time left and they had a chance to make it a two-touchdown game.

Two-point attempt with 7:49 remaining in the fourth quarter

This time, DeVonta Smith’s spectacular touchdown catch put the Eagles ahead 12 points. Going for two here made sense. Going up 14 points makes more sense than 13 points. From the 2-yard line, the Eagles ran their go-to run/pass option, but the Jaguars were prepared for it and Philadelphia failed to convert.

57-yard field goal attempt with 2:16 remaining in the fourth quarter

The Jaguars had cut the lead to five. Though kicker Jake Elliott has typically been good from long range in his career, he was 0-for-2 on field goals of over 50 yards this season. Elliott missed, giving the Jaguars fantastic field position. A punt could have pinned them deep but would still give the Jaguars a chance to win the game with a touchdown. This was a difficult decision.

The Jaguars drove the ball to the Eagles’ 13-yard line, but the game was ended by Nakobe Dean’s interception in the end zone. I believe going for all those two-point conversions was overaggressive, but I also understand sticking with your philosophy with a play as unstoppable as the “tush push.” Teams typically won’t give you many two-point conversions from the 1-yard line, but it happened twice in this game. Maybe the Eagles will rethink this approach, especially against weaker opponents. The Eagles were 7.5-point favorites and some teams have point spreads baked into their probability models.

Sirianni is getting heavily scrutinized over these decisions and I generally agree that he was overaggressive, but this wouldn’t be a conversation if they converted. I think there’s more nuance in these decisions when looking at them in a vacuum.

Seahawks forgoing OT field goal

The Seahawks received the ball first in overtime and drove down to the Rams’ 16-yard line. On fourth-and-1, they decided to go for it rather than kick a field goal. If they kicked a field goal, the Rams could still win the game with a touchdown on the next possession. Against a great quarterback like Matthew Stafford, they went for the win.

On the following drive, Stafford was electric and drove the Rams downfield, ending the game with a walk-off 39-yard touchdown pass to Demarcus Robinson.

If the Seahawks kicked the field goal, they wouldn’t have been as aggressive defensively. They had a heavy blitz called with no deep safety to try to keep the Rams from getting into field goal range, but Stafford is as good as any quarterback in clutch situations. Seahawks coach Mike Macdonald made the right decision to try to end the game without giving Stafford the ball back, sometimes it just doesn’t work out.

(Top photo of Drew Petzing: Christian Petersen / Getty Images)